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Since the early 1960s, the Navy has witnessed the
introduction of aircraft of increasing technical complexity.
While possessing superior tactical abilities as an outgrowth
of this technical complexity, these aircraft have displayed
an increasing need for specialized repair capabilities. As
a result, the number and types of support equipment (SE)
required to maintain them have risen dramatically. This
thesis examines the policies and methods for support equip-
ment acquisition and management as established by the Naval
Air Systems Command. The primary focus is on the integra-
tion of these procedures with the program management struc-
ture of specific aircraft programs. The research examines
in-depth several innovations to the support equipment
planning and management process instituted with the F/A-18
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Since the early 1960s, the Navy has witnessed the
introduction of aircraft of increasing technical complexity.
While possessing superior tactical abilities as an outgrowth
of this technical complexity, these aircraft have displayed
an increasing need for specialized repair capabilities. As
a result, the number and types of support equipment (SE)
required to maintain them have risen dramatically. Total
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) support equipment fiscal
requirements for procurement for FY 86 were $935 million and
for FY 87 are budgeted at $857 million. Although these
figures represent a downward trend, the support equipment
budget remains a significant item in any major weapon system
program. [Ref. 1]
The increased sophistication of modern aircraft has
increased the cost and complexity of all support areas. Due
to cost overruns and poor operational availability on
several weapon system programs, an increased effort was
necessary to give support a more visible role in the acqui-
sition process. The Department of Defense solution to this
situation was the concept known as Integrated Logistic
Support (ILS) . (Appendix A provides an overview of the DOD
Integrated Logistic Support Process.) Support equipment is
considered one of the ten logistic elements which are to be
integrated and coordinated by the aircraft Program Manage-
ment Office (PMO) . It was also recognized that the
individual aircraft/system program management efforts did
not possess the broad perspective necessary to match the
resources required with demands in the support equipment
area. Additionally, a preoccupation with airborne systems
and components within the PMO resulted in insufficient
emphasis being placed on the necessity for concurrent
development, procurement, and availability of support
equipment with the aircraft system. These concepts are the
primary factors influencing the state of program support
equipment manaqement as it exists today.
Aviation support equipment is that equipment which
provides maintenance support directly to an aircraft weapon
system or an uninstalled aircraft component underqoing test
or repair. Support equipment can be divided into two broad
categories
—
peculiar and common support equipment. Common
support equipment is an item of support equipment which has
application to, and is used in support of, more than one
system or aircraft. Of particular importance is peculiar
support equipment (PSE) . PSE is that equipment which has
specific application to only one type of weapon system.
Classifyinq a piece of support equipment as PSE does not
necessarily mean that it is unique to one specific aircraft,
but rather that it is unique to one specific system that may
be used on several different types of aircraft. PSE may
include both hardware and software, particularly in light of
the emphasis on automated testing in avionics maintenance.
In most cases, PSE must be designed and developed in
conjunction with the end article. The most significant
increases in both requirements and funding for support
equipment in recent years have been for peculiar support
equipment. PSE is a significant part of the acquisition
cost of any aircraft weapon system. On the F/A-18 program,
PSE spending currently represents approximately 10 percent
of total program spending [Ref. 2].
The intent of this thesis is to examine the policies and
methods for support equipment acquisition and management as
established by the Naval Air Systems Command. The primary
focus will be on the integration of these procedures with
the program management structure of specific aircraft
programs. The research will examine in-depth several inno-
vations to the support equipment planning and management
process instituted with the F/A-18 program and evaluate them
for effectiveness.
B . APPROACH
The research scheme for this thesis consisted of a
comprehensive review of existing directives, instructions,
other written material, and interviews with personnel of the
functional divisions at the Naval Air Systems Command Head-
quarters and the F/A-18 Program Management Office. This
thesis concentrated on the specific interactions of the Navy-
participants in the support equipment management process and
did not examine the operating methods or management struc-
tures of typical weapon system prime or support equipment
contractors. The thesis assumes a basic knowledge of the
DOD Integrated Logistic Support process. Appendix A
provides a comprehensive overview of this concept.
C. LIMITATIONS
The area of contractual strategies to incentivize
contractor performance holds great potential for improving
SE schedule performance. However, due to the numerous
combinations of incentive strategies possible and the
primary focus of this thesis on program management tech-
niques, the arena of specific strategies to incentivize
contracts was deemed not within the scope of this study.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into an introduction, three
development chapters and a final chapter of conclusions and
recommendations. Chapter II provides an overview of the
organizational structure and relationships of support
equipment planning and management. Chapter III addresses
the support equipment management innovations utilized in the
F/A-18 program. Chapter IV evaluates these techniques for
effectiveness.
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Two appendices are also included. Appendix A provides
an overview of the ILS process. Appendix B provides a
comprehensive list of acronyms used in this study. Appendix
C presents a summary overview of the acquisition process.
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II. SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ORGANIZATION
The responsibility for the development and procurement
of support equipment for Naval Aviation is vested in the
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) [Ref.
3:p. 3]. Under his direction, these activities are
conducted by the functional divisions of NAVAIRSYSCOM head-
quarters and various field activities. The support equip-
ment effort for specific aircraft programs is accomplished
under the direction of the Program Manager—Air (PMA) as
designated by the Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM. The PMA pursues
this tasking through a small, dedicated staff in the Program
Management Office and the assistance of representatives of
NAVAIR functional divisions assigned to him through a matrix
organization concept. This section will provide an overview
of the NAVAIR functional organization, the functional
organization of the Program Management Office, and the
matrix organization through which both interact.
A. NAVAIR FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION
Figure 1 presents the organizational structure of the
NAVAIR headquarters for support equipment. The organization
follows the classic form of functional organization in that
all those engaged in similar activities are brought together
in one group. The functional groups are each further
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narrow range of skills and responsibilities. Routine work-
load is processed functionally through the groups.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the support equipment
effort involves a number of the NAVAIR functional groups in
some manner. The principal participants in the design,
development, procurement, deployment and logistic support of
SE are AIR-417, Support Equipment Logistics Management
Division and AIR-552, Support Equipment Division. These
divisions are organized under AIR-4 , Logistics/Fleet Support
and AIR-05, Systems/Engineering, respectively. The program
management offices which are responsible for the integration
of SE requirements into the overall management of a weapon
system are organized under AIR-01, Projects Director.
Projects Director is an additional duty for the Deputy
Commander—Program Support.
1. AIR-01
The Deputy Commander for Program Support is
responsible for providing command-wide direction and
coordination of planning, programming, priorities determina-
tion, and management information to foster a cohesive opera-
tion in meeting overall command goals and objectives [Ref.
4:p. 01-3]. As stated above, an additional duty of the
Deputy Commander, Program Support is that of Projects
Director. It is in this capacity that AIR-01 is responsible
for developing, monitoring, and coordinating the overall
activities of assigned major weapon system programs [Ref.
14
4]. The organization of AIR-01, Projects Director is
further divided into Weapons Programs, Anti-Submarine
Warfare Programs and Tactical Aircraft Programs under the
auspices of Program Directors. It is within these categor-
ies that the various weapon system PMOs are organized
according to their intended mission. All Program Managers-
Air (PMAs) are accountable to the Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM
through their respective Program Director and the Deputy
Commander and Projects Director (AIR-01). [Ref. 5:p. 2]
2. AIR-04
The Assistant Commander for Logistics/Fleet Support
has the primary responsibility of developing, executing, and
managing all elements of integrated logistic support for
each aeronautical weapon system developed or procured for
U.S. Navy use [Ref. 4:p. 04-1]. Of primary importance in
the support equipment arena are the functional divisions
AIR-410, Logistics Management and AIR-417, Support Equipment
Logistics Management.
AIR-410 is tasked with accomplishing overall ILS
management on all NAVAIR designated weapon system programs.
This includes both existing and proposed aircraft. In this
capacity, AIR-410 plays a pivotal role in the selection and
assignment of the Assistant Program Manager-Logistics
(APML) . As will be discussed in a later section, the APML
is responsible for the coordination and integration of the
15
specific program's total logistic support efforts including
maintenance engineering and SE acquisition. [Ref. 6:p. 30]
AIR-417, as its title suggests, is the division of
AIR-04 dedicated solely to support equipment. The objective
of this division is to develop plans and policies for
timely, effective, and economical life cycle integrated
logistic support for all support equipment. Areas of empha-
sis include SE maintenance engineering, inventory
management, supply support and managing the support
equipment rework proqram. This division is specifically
tasked with accomplishinq ILS manaqement on SE for aircraft,
aircraft equipment, and support equipment for NAVAIR desiq-
nated proqram offices (PMOs) . [Ref. 4:p. 417-3]
3. AIR-05
Operational planninq and execution of approved
proqrams from concept exploration throuqh delivery is the
responsibility of the Assistant Commander for Systems and
Enqineerinq. Contained within this sphere of responsibility
is the development and enqineerinq of support systems.
These activities for SE are executed within the AIR-05 qroup
by the Support Equipment Division, AIR-552. The Support
Equipment Division is the NAVAIR focal point for SE and has
the ultimate responsibility for ensurinq that suitable SE is
developed and made available to the fleet. [Ref. 4:p. 552-
3]
16
The Director of the Support Equipment Division (AIR-
552) assumes a significant role in the support equipment
development, procurement, and management process. Since
June, 19 67 he has been chartered as the Program Manager for
Support Equipment [Ref. 3:p. 2]. This action took place in
response to the increasing numbers of complex weapons
systems in operation and under development. Although the
Integrated Logistics Support concept had been adopted
throughout DOD earlier in the decade, increasingly complex
weapon systems generated a demand for more elaborate,
costly, and varied types of SE. Support equipment was
assuming an increasingly important and costly role in the
development and introduction of aeronautical weapons
systems. Clearly, a concentrated effort was required to
reduce the quantity and variety of SE being introduced to
the fleet. A NAVAIR determination was made that a
centrally-managed and coordinated design, development, and
procurement program for new SE items was necessary. Addi-
tionally, this effort was to focus primarily on multi-
purpose equipment rather than specialized or peculiar
equipment and be pursued under the program management
concept. [Ref. 3:p. 2]
Under the terms of his charter, the Program Manager
for Support Equipment (PM-SE) is tasked with overall
direction and control of the support equipment program. The
PM-SE has the same authority and responsibility for SE as
17
the PMA has for his weapon system. In this capacity he
reports directly to the Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM. Program
Managers are specifically directed to work closely with the
PM-SE to ensure that program support eguipment reguirements,
plans, and funds are made available in a timely manner. The
role of AIR-552 was further strengthened when he was later
designated System Program Manager for Support Eguipment
(SPM-SE) . In accordance with NAVAIR policy, System Program
Managers are designated for command-wide management of
selected commodity area programs which reguire intensified
management and centralized direction [Ref. 5:p. 2]. With
this action, support eguipment was elevated functionally to
a level commensurate with that of the Program Management
Office. This arrangement ensures the review, with the PMA
and APML, of trade-offs among support elements which may be
detrimental to support eguipment. Examples of such trade-
offs include eguitable sharing of general budget reductions
and transfer of funds between elements to cover an unantici-
pated shortfall.
4 . NAVAIR Field Support Activities
The NAVAIR field support activities are organized
functionally under AIR-04 and AIR-42, Navy Ranges and Field
Activity. The field support activities are directed to
provide technical support to the SPM-SE in the areas of
engineering, logistics, test and evaluation, and production.
Additionally, the PMA possesses the authority to direct the
18
assignment of tasks to field activities through the appro-
priate NAVAIR functional element [Ref. 5:p. 6]. The field
support activities primarily involved with support eguipment
are the Naval Avionics Center (NAC) , Naval Air Engineering
Center (NAEC) , and the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC)
.
B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE
It is a fundamental Department of Defense policy that
all major weapon system acquisitions will be directed by a
specifically responsible manager under the concept of
program management [Ref. 7:p. 1] . Within NAVAIRSYSCOM, the
single, central executive responsible for the successful
completion of a designated program is the Program Manager-
Air (PMA) . Upon appointment the PMA is issued a tailored
charter which lists the mission, authority and responsibili-
ties of the program. He receives his authority from and is
ultimately accountable to the Commander, NAVAIRSYSCOM.
Accordingly, the PMA is authorized direct access to the Com-
mander, from whom he receives broad policy guidance. The
PMA's tenure is to be of sufficient length to provide con-
tinuity and personal accountability. Current NAVAIR policy
for a PMA assignment is four years [Ref. 8]. The PMA billet
is equivalent to that of a major command and is normally
filled by a Navy captain or Marine Corps colonel.
Program management within NAVAIR is based on the matrix
organization concept. Accordingly, the staff of the Program
Management Office (PMO) is small relative to the entire team
19
working on the program. Sections for Business/Finance,
Foreign Military Sales, Engineering and Advanced Develop-
ment, and Fleet Readiness form the core of the typical PMO.
Figure 2 illustrates the essential elements of the current
F/A-18 program office. The sections within the PMO conduct
liaison and act as contact points for their counterparts in
the functional divisions. Of prime importance, from the
perspective of support eguipment, is the Fleet Readiness
section. This section serves as the PMO interface between
the fleet user and the logistics community in AIR-04. In
this way, the Fleet Readiness section can serve as a
clearinghouse for fleet problems and help direct the program
logistics efforts [Ref. 9]. Although the Fleet Readiness
section deals primarily with logistic support and logistics
concerns, it is important to stress that it does not include
the logistics specialists for the program. The APML in AIR-
410 remains the primary figure responsible for the identifi-
cation, development, and management of logistic support for
the program.
C. NAVAIR PROGRAM MATRIX STRUCTURE
In order to solve complex problems, such as those found
in the development and support of modern weapon systems, a
multidisciplinary approach is reguired. Many organizations
have found superimposition of program management on the



































































two types of program management organization most widely
used today are the pure program and matrix structures.
The pure program organizational structure is built on
the concept of an independent entity. Personnel reguired
for the program are assigned solely to the PMO and are not
shared with any functional division. They are under the
direct and immediate control of the Program Manager (PM) .
In most cases, the staff is physically located with or near
the PM. Primary advantages of the pure program structure
include: [Ref. 10:pp. 53-54]
- Reduction in the PM effort reguired to coordinate the
various elements of the program. The PM has ready
access to and complete control of program personnel.
- Fewer organizational barriers, such as those between
program and functional staffs, can improve communica-
tion and enhance information transfer.
- Physical proximity and PM direct control facilitate
faster response times.
The pure program structure is the primary organizational
structure used by the U.S. Air Force for the management of
weapon system acguisition [Ref. ll:p. 2]. The foremost
disadvantage of the pure program organization is the
considerable cost reguired to establish and maintain the
structure, both in terms of money and personnel.
A primary advantage of the matrix organization, due to
the sharing of resources, is its cost effectiveness. Other
advantages include: [Ref. 10:pp. 56-57]
- Retention of the technical specialists within the
functional divisions vice the program office permits
increased professional interaction among disciplines.
22
"Lessons learned" on a specific program can be evaluated
for use on many programs.
- Program support is provided by offices with a long-term
interest and commitment to their speciality and the
specific program. This is contrasted to the temporary
nature of the pure program organization.
While the matrix structure presents many advantages, the
complexity of the alignment and its working relationships
can be cumbersome and difficult to implement. Additionally,
there is a high potential for conflict between program and
functional managers, who may each possess a parochial point
of view.
NAVAIRSYSCOM program management is conducted within the
framework of the matrix structure. The PMA, with the
assistance of his assigned PMO staff, exercises centralized
program authority. The program office is supported in this
effort by technical specialists within the various
functional divisions. The technical specialists remain
assigned to their respective divisions, not the program
office. Although the PMA exercises the program authority,
he is dependent on the managers of the functional divisions
to control the technical resources reguired to meet program
objectives. Figure 3 characterizes the general relation-
ships between program management and functional management
and their respective orientations under the matrix concept.
As can be readily seen, the ability of the PMA and his staff
to effectively coordinate and direct the functional divi-






















































The effectiveness of the PMA is highly dependent on his
ability to foster a teamwork approach among the technical
specialists in the functional divisions. In this regard,
the PMA is aided by Assistant Program Managers (e.g., APML)
who are assigned, with the concurrence of the PMA, by each
functional group. The APM serves a dual purpose role
—
representing specific program interests within the
functional group and simultaneously representing the
functional group to the program. It is through the Assis-
tant Program Managers that the PMA coordinates the support
efforts of the functional groups to meet program goals for
cost, schedule, performance, and logistics supportability
.
1. Support Equipment Management Structure
As mentioned earlier, the increasing cost and low
operational availability of weapon systems in the 1970s had
served to focus scrutiny on support and logistic functions.
The practice of sacrificing program funds intended for
support in order to cover unanticipated shortfalls in system
performance was widespread. This phenomenon was perhaps no
better illustrated than in 1977 when all cost estimates of
the F-14 aircraft exceeded original projections while the
aircraft was experiencing an operational availability rate
of less than 40% [Ref. 6:p. 16]. These events provided the
impetus for the enhanced status of support equipment within
NAVAIR.
25
Probably the most significant event serving to
increase SE visibility was the designation of the Director,
AIR-552, as System Program Manager for Support Eguipment
(SPM-SE) , as stated earlier. The SPM-SE, chartered in the
same manner as the Program Manager, is ultimately responsi-
ble for coordination and management of all aspects of NAVAIR
SE programs [Ref. 3:p. 3]. While the SPM-SE has overall
responsibility for SE development and management, his
designated representative—the Support Eguipment Program
Officer (SEPO) —serves as the primary SE interface with the
individual program office. The SEPO is responsible for both
the identification and procurement of peculiar support
eguipment and the identification of common support eguipment
for the weapon system. In this endeavor, the SEPO is
supported by AIR-552 designated Acguisition Managers who are
responsible for the acguisition of support eguipment within
a specific commodity area (e.g., Aircraft Starting
Eguipment)
.
Most Acguisition Managers support more than one
program when commonality of eguipment exists within a
commodity area. While all PSE is procured by the Acguisi-
tion Managers in AIR-552, the majority of CSE (that which
has reached a mature design stage and is established as an
inventory item) is procured by the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) in Philadelphia, PA. Common support eguipment
reguirements for a specific program are passed to ASO by the
26
SEPO. A minority of CSE items, those of developing design,
are procured by the Acguisition Managers in AIR-552. [Ref.
12]
AIR-417 completes the assembly of NAVAIR headguar-
ters participants in the SE matrix structure. Charged with
the ILS management of support equipment, the Director,
Support Eguipment Logistics Division appoints a Logistics
Manager-Support Eguipment (LM-SE) . As SE requirements are
identified for the program, the SEPO feeds this information
to the LM-SE in AIR-417. This provides AIR-417 the oppor-
tunity to analyze and plan the integrated logistic support
for the SE itself prior to acquisition. There is also fre-
quent interaction between the LM-SE and the Acquisition
Managers in AIR-552 to coordinate ILS elements for support
equipment.
Technical support is provided to both the SEPO and
the LM-SE by the Naval Air Engineering Center, a NAVAIR
field support activity. Figure 4 presents the essential
elements of the NAVAIR support equipment matrix as it exists
for the F/A-18 program.
2 . Integrated Logistic Support Matrix
Integrated logistic support analysis is performed
for each end item of the weapon system. This process is
accomplished by the Integrated Logistic Support Management
Team (ILSMT) . The ILSMT determines the quantitative












































































management and decision making documentation. These
logistic requirements are determined by each element of
support (e.g., publications, personnel, support equipment).
In the context of support equipment, there are two ILSMT's
that must be considered—one for the support equipment
element itself and one for the weapons system as a whole.
The ILSMT for the support equipment itself is headed
up by AIR-417. As the designated ILS Manager for Support
Equipment, AIR-417 consolidates all required logistic sup-
port for the support equipment that is identified for the
program by the SEPO (from AIR-552) . This information then
flows to the PMA via the APML through the weapons system
ILSMT.
The ILSMT for the weapons system is chaired by the
APML. It is through the vehicle of the ILSMT that the APML
is able to coordinate and integrate all logistic elements
toward the support of the weapons system itself. The team
consists predominately of representatives of the various
functional divisions within AIR-04, supporting each logistic
element. The logistic element of support equipment is
represented on the weapons system ILSMT by a group headed by
the Logistic Element Manager for Support Equipment (LEM-SE)
.
Due to the similarity of tasks, the LEM-SE is normally the
designated SEPO from AIR-552. In this way, the analysis and
planning of the support equipment ILSMT can be blended with
the overall logistics planning for the weapons system.
29
D . SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an overview of the principal
participants involved in coordinating support equipment
requirements for NAVAIR weapon system programs. NAVAIR pro-
gram management is conducted through the matrix organization
structure. The primary functional divisions with regard to
support equipment are the Support Equipment Division (AIR-
552), and the Support Equipment Logistics Division (AIR-
417) . The Director, Support Equipment Division is the
designated NAVAIR System Program Manager for SE (SPM-SE)
.
In this capacity, he is responsible for the overall
direction and management of all NAVAIR support equipment
programs. The weapon system program itself is headed by the
Program Manager-Air (PMA) , specifically responsible for the
successful completion of the program. The PMA manages the
program through the small staff of the Program Management
Office and designated representatives of the functional
divisions. Support equipment requirements for the program
are executed by the Support Equipment Program Officer
(SEPO) , the designated representative of AIR-552 assigned to
the program. Coordination of all logistics elements for the
program, including support equipment, is the responsibility
of the Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (APML)
.
30
III. THE F/A-18 APPROACH TO ILS/SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The complex weapons systems introduced in the late 1960s
and early 1970s had provided the Navy with an impressive
potential tactical advantage. However, this potential had
been severely constrained by an inability to sustain a high
level of operational readiness in the fleet environment.
The earlier mentioned shortfalls with the F-14 program had
drawn Congressional attention to Navy acquisition procedures
and added a significant impetus to the F/A-18 program. The
F/A-18 was a direct result of Congressional cuts in F-14
procurement and the Navy's desire to procure a less
expensive augment to the F-14. Implicit in this desire were
the design goals of commonality, multi-mission capability,
and high reliability and maintainability. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
Although the ILS discipline and methodology had been
integrated into DOD acquisition procedures since 1964, the
expected benefits of this methodology had not been fully
realized. The low readiness rates and inadequate support
efforts affecting aircraft programs of this era were the
same problems that had existed for many years. This situa-
tion was exacerbated by the increasingly complex avionics
systems on these aircraft and the requirement for sophisti-
cated support and test equipment. Clearly, an acquisition
31
strategy which focused primarily on performance and subor-
dinated the support effort was no longer practical.
Historically, the design and procurement of aviation
weapon systems had proceeded from a performance perspective.
Program Managers, especially those on tactical aircraft pro-
grams, were typically from the performance-oriented fighter
and attack communities. While superior aircraft performance
is a necessary and desirable goal, the pursuit of weapon
system performance at the expense of other programs goals
typically resulted in minimal early planning for support.
Additionally, any funding shortfalls that arose in the
development of the aircraft were normally resolved by a cut
in funding for some or all elements of support. A common
philosophy espoused was that which said if the aircraft
meets performance reguirements, money to solve support defi-
ciencies would be made available [Ref. 6:p. 45]. The F/A-18
was to be the first aircraft acquisition program which would
include actual compromises between performance and supporta-
bility goals from the earliest planning stages. Also, it
would be the first program to incentivize support as well as
performance. [Ref. 13]
An additional factor influencing the formulation of the
F/A-18 acquisition philosophy was the SPM-SE chartered
requirement to reduce the proliferation of PSE [Ref. 3:p.
2]. This requirement was to be pursued through the concept
of maximum standardization of reguired F/A-18 SE across the
32
current support equipment inventory. A crucial aspect of
this is the identification of support equipment requirements
as early as possible in the weapon system development. This
is the most effective means by which the design of the
weapon system and its components can be influenced toward
compatibility with existing support and test equipment.
The prime objective of the F/A-18 ILS program is to
design, develop, and deliver a logistic support system that
enables the fleet user to achieve an operational readiness
rate of 85% [Ref. 14:p. 15]. This program is an example of
one which incorporates a number of innovations in support
development, beginning with the early stages of the program.
Some of the methods represent an improvement on or a formal
recognition of beneficial practices developed on earlier
programs. This chapter identifies the supportability inno-
vations that were instituted with the F/A-18 program with
respect to support equipment and the related PMO/ functional
matrix interface. While some of the innovations do not
apply directly to the subject of support equipment, their
affect on the integrated support system indirectly
influences SE. The primary source for the material in this
chapter is a study conducted by Rodney Donald Beran and Paul
Roger Decker at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1977 [Ref.
6], during the early stages of the F/A-18 program. In the
following chapter, the long term effectiveness of these
33
innovations is evaluated based on interviews of key person-
nel currently involved with the program.
B. WEAPON SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter is a multi-mission
aircraft designed for aircraft carrier operations. The
twin-engine aircraft was developed with the intention of
replacing the F-4 and the A-7 aircraft in the Navy and
Marine Corps inventory. The F/A-18 will perform fighter and
light attack missions such as strike escort, fleet air
defense, interdiction, and close air support. Though not
currently a part of the program, original plans included the
development of a photo/reconnaissance version of the Hornet
to replace the RF-4 and RF-8 aircraft.
The F/A-18 is designed and produced to permit two
configurations— fighter and attack. The two versions are
identical except for external eguipment or ordnance peculiar
to their particular mission.
The F/A-18 Full Scale Development Phase began in early
1976, and the first flight was made in November, 1978 (see
Appendix C for a summary overview of the typical weapon
system acguisition process) . The initial Navy F/A-18
sguadron was commissioned on November 13, 1980 at the
Lemoore Naval Air Station and received its first aircraft in
February, 1981. This was the Fleet Readiness Sguadron,
responsible for training Navy and Marine Corps fighter and
attack pilots and also maintenance personnel of both
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branches. Initial Operational Capability was scheduled for
December, 1982 with the Marine Corps and the first F/A-18
carrier deployment was scheduled for 1985.
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri
is the airframe prime contractor. McDonnell Douglas has
overall weapon system performance and technical management
responsibility. Principal subcontractors include the
Northrop Corporation, producing the major fuselage
components and Hughes Aircraft Company, producing the radar
system for the aircraft. The General Electric Company
developed and produces the aircraft's F404 turbofan engines.
C. ADVANCE PLANNING FOR SUPPORT
A review of the experience associated with many of the
systems in use today will indicate that the resultant output
is highly influenced by the planning and design decisions
made during the early phases of the system acquisition cycle
[Ref. 15:p. 87]. Because the elements of logistics can
significantly influence life cycle costs and effectiveness,
it is necessary that support concerns be addressed from the
beginning of the program. While this principle would seem
obvious given today's knowledge, it apparently was of
marginal concern in programs prior to the F/A-18. A quote
from the APML during the initial stages of the program is
indicative of the F/A-18 commitment to support as well as
performance: [Ref. 6:p. 35]
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It seems in past programs logistics received little PMA
attention until fleet introduction. The major area of
concern was the design and performance of the aircraft.
This trend has been reversed in the F/A-18 program. PMA-
265 is keenly aware of the importance of detailed planning
and integration of logistics from the beginning of the
program.
In the area of support equipment, AIR-552 was involved
beginning with the Full Scale Development contract pre-award
period. The Support Equipment Division screened the
procurement package presented to contractors for inclusion
of appropriate Military Standards (MIL STDS) and for
compatibility with existing Automatic Test Equipment. AIR-
552 was also a participant in the subsequent evaluation of
proposals submitted by contractors. [Ref. 6: p. 4-4]
Another factor in concert with the theme of early
support planning was the timely establishment of the
Resident Integrated Logistic Support Detachment (RILSD) at
the contractor's facility. This event occurred within 30
days of the award of the Full Scale Development contract.
The RILSD is a team of technically qualified Navy personnel
who are responsible to the APML. The Detachment's purpose
is to: [Ref. 17:pp. 2-9]
1. Provide continuous on-site technical liaison and make
recommendations to the contractor's F/A-18 Program
Management organization during the initial logistics
development.
2. To review, approve as authorized, and make recommenda-
tions to NAVAIR concerning contractor deliverables
pertinent to the ILS discipline.
3. Perform a monitoring function of the development of
the ILS discipline.
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The charter of the RILSD specifically addressed support
equipment issues. Additionally, the RILSD included for the
first time a dedicated support equipment representative from
NAEC, the AIR-552 field activity for technical support. A
primary emphasis of the SE representative was participation
in all phases of design review in order to influence
standardization of support equipment requirements.
Further evidence of the commitment to support on the
program was the incentive structure of the F/A-18 Full Scale
Development contract. The contract, of the Cost Plus Incen-
tive Fee type, contained incentives totalling approximately
$30 million that were split between performance and support
[Ref. 6:p. 35]. Incentive awards in the support area were
to be based on pre-deployment and post-deployment evalua-
tions of supportability [Ref. 17:p. 10-5]. Due to the
inextricable link between adequate and well-functioning
support equipment and the supportability of the aircraft, SE
would be a prime factor in determining the incentive award.
In this case, PSE, which is normally procured from the prime
contractor, would be especially significant. For the first
time, a portion of the contractor's fee would be determined
by how well the peculiar support equipment performed in the
fleet. An additional benefit of the post-deployment
supportability demonstration, although not related to any
incentive award determination, would be valuable feedback on
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the suitability of all ILS resources in supporting deployed
aircraft.
In reference to selection and design of PSE, a
continuing effort was made in the F/A-18 program to priori-
tize the development of maintenance capabilities (i.e.,
maintenance plans, training, technical publications, PSE,
etc.) within previously determined maintenance levels
(organizational (0) , intermediate (I) , or depot (D) ) . The
prioritization was based on reliability and maintainability
predictions that resulted from the weapon system design
process. Those components/systems with the lowest mean time
between failure (MTBF) were logically expected to compose
the majority of maintenance actions. As a result, these
items were targeted for the highest priority in development
of organic (Navy) maintenance capability. It was felt this
practice would have a significant impact on the timing of
PSE development and further narrow the focus of the PSE
effort in the early stages of the. program. [Ref. 6:p. 36]
D. PHASED SUPPORT
The concept of phased support, as utilized in the F/A-18
program, is based on the assumption that full Navy support
cannot be attained on a single, specific date. Contractor
support, at a cost of approximately $30 million, was planned
to continue until system design had stabilized, support
eguipment was fully configured for fleet use, and the Navy
was capable of performing the reguisite maintenance tasks
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[Ref. 18 :p. 6]. Although the phased support concept would
increase total program cost, the opinion in NAVAIR was that
it would enable the Navy to achieve and maintain a high
level of operational readiness during the aircraft's early
deployment years.
Another expected benefit was that phased support would
permit the Navy to acquire the necessary skills and material
resources to assume maintenance responsibility without
degrading operational capability. On programs prior to the
F/A-18, the Navy had assumed maintenance and supply support
responsibility at a much earlier point in the program.
Because these systems were at the very early stages of their
operational life, many required design modifications to
correct deficiencies not discovered until the systems were
exercised in the fleet operational environment. In many
instances, the design changes would cause a change in main-
tenance procedures, publications, or equipment. This condi-
tion necessitated a maintenance capability that was in a
constant state of flux. The phased support concept shifts
the risk of early maintenance and support problems from the
Navy to the contractor. Ideally, the weapon system and its
support subsystems will be debugged before the Navy assumes
responsibility.
The S-3A program introduced the phased support concept
in 1972 [Ref. 14:p. 12]. In the case of the S-3A however,
the phased support program did not include maintenance
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capability, but was restricted to the transition of supply-
support only. The F/A-18 program utilized the phased
support concept for both supply support and maintenance
capability. The contractor was also required to demonstrate
successful support system operation, with production support
equipment in a fleet environment, before the Navy would
assume maintenance responsibility. [Ref. 19 :p. 38]
In order to facilitate the contractor's support equip-
ment development process and to permit opportunities for SE
design to mature, Factory Test Equipment was to be used
during contractor flight testing and Navy Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation. Prior to the Board of
Inspection and Survey (BIS) trials for final acceptance of
the aircraft for Naval service, the contractor was required
to deliver production SE for the organizational maintenance
level. During BIS Navy personnel performed the necessary
organizational level maintenance while the contractor
performed intermediate and depot level maintenance. [Ref.
6:p. 39]
The F/A-18 phased support concept was based on three
assumptions: [Ref. 20:p. 3-2]
1. The transition of the maintenance capability and
material support responsibility must be concurrently
planned and managed.
2. The rate of maturity of the weapon system design
determines when the maintenance plan analysis can be
initiated and subsequently, when maintenance resources
(e.g., support equipment) can be made available.
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3. The detail of design, which dictates system level
maintenance requirements, stabilizes earlier than the
design detail which dictates component maintenance
requirements
.
Implicit in these assumptions is the prioritization of
maintenance capabilities within the three levels of mainte-
nance (0, I, and D) , and therefore support equipment
development, based on system design maturity. The assump-
tions also recognized that the rate of design maturity would
vary with the level of design (system versus component)
.
Since system level maintenance would be performed at the "0"
level, this latter factor was the basis for the transition
of organizational maintenance capability preceding the
transition of intermediate and depot level capability.
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed timetable for the F/A-18
phased support plan.
E. NARF NORTH ISLAND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TEAM
An integral part of the phased support plan was the
creation of the Logistic Support Team at the Naval Air
Rework Facility (NARF) , North Island, California. This
team, consisting primarily of engineering personnel, was
established to provide technical support to the APML in
managing the ILS elements [Ref. 6:p. 41]. Originally
intended to be part of the Resident Integrated Logistic
Support Detachment at the contractor's facility, the Logis-
tic Support Team was established at NARF North Island due to
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in St. Louis [Ref. 6:p. 71]. The North Island location was
chosen because the facility had already been selected as the
eventual Cognizant Field Activity, responsible for depot
level maintenance and periodic overhaul of the aircraft.
In order to provide additional visibility for the
management of the logistic support elements, the functional
systems of the aircraft (e.g., landing gear system, fuel
system, etc.) were assembled into nine functional groups.
Figure 6 displays the functional groups and their respective
systems. The systems are grouped based on their similarity
in engineering requirements and the necessary educational
and experience backgrounds of their designers [Ref. 6:p.
41]. The primary function of the team's organization is to
assist the APML in managing the ILS elements within each
functional group. While the Logistics Element Managers in
NAVAIR retained cognizance of the elements and could make
cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs within their
specific elements, the support system development within
each functional group was monitored by the NARF Logistics
Support Team. Following identification of a difficulty
within a functional group by the NARF team, the APML could
use higher order tradeoffs across elements as a possible
solution. In this way, not only was the support system
development managed by each ILS element, but also with a

















































































2 o f> r^
-









^3 c - >so £
^5 >
u — — 15 CO
> mi C err
3 3 Oe ~ —. 2 - 3 2 i-l e
3 3 3
































a > "5 o
2 J -2
3





to u. a. a.
U









2 3 33 a 3 f* 2 3 -n r* o ^% a 33 2 3 n <r o a a — e*







C c 1 £ ^2 >
to
->







































K c i 1




















O e s e
5 3 cm J3 <a o -.' a <n *r 2 3 r^ O O




































The responsibilities of the NARF Logistic Support Team
were summarized as threefold: [Ref. 20:p. 3-19]
1. To verify that the maintenance resources, identified
by the contractor, meet the support concepts.
2. To monitor the acquisition of assets and make support
tradeoff recommendations between ILS elements and also
functional systems.
3. To assess supportability and monitor changes.
F. APML ROLE IN SUPPORT MANAGEMENT
Traditionally, the Assistant Program Manager for
Logistics has had the responsibility for coordinating the
overall support system for an aircraft program. His primary
purpose is to ensure an ILS system that will meet
established program objectives. The ability of the APML to
accomplish these tasks was significantly strengthened on the
F/A-18 program. For the first time, the APML was placed in
the funding flow from the PMA to the Logistics Element
Managers.
This management technique is consistent with the bias to
action evident throughout the F/A-18 support system develop-
ment. The support system management is focused on recogniz-
ing the inherent characteristics of the system and planning
early to accommodate them. The phased support concept
recognizes that all support equipment will not be available
on a specific date and requires management by functional
group. Tradeoffs among functional groups or elements of
support may be necessary to accommodate the situation.
45
Placement of the APML in the funds flow process enables him
to make adjustments as necessary from the perspective of the
support system as a whole. [Ref. 6]
G. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
The consistent theme of high readiness rates through
supportability and the complexity of the onboard avionics
had influenced the F/A-18 program toward maximum utilization
of Automatic Test Equipment (ATE). 1 In concert with the
NAVAIR policy of decreased proliferation of PSE, Automatic
Test Equipment that was currently in the Navy inventory was
to be used to the greatest extent possible. An example of
ATE in the current inventory used extensively is the
Versatile Avionics Shop Test (VAST) . VAST is used at the
intermediate maintenance level to perform diagnostic tests
on the avionics components of various types of operational
aircraft. In order to test avionics components of various
configurations on test equipment of a standard configura-
tion, an intermediate device is required. This link is
called the Test Program Set (TPS)
.
A TPS consists of four items—two of a software nature
and two of a hardware nature—though occasional exceptions
do exist. The software components consist of the Test
Program Instruction, a set of directions to the operator on
^Automatic Test Equipment is equipment that carries out
a predetermined program of testing for possible malfunction
without reliance upon human intervention.
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how to perform a diagnostic test with this particular TPS
and component, and the Test Program Medium, a magnetic tape
which contains the electronic instructions to the test
equipment required to perform fault isolation on a particu-
lar piece of avionics equipment. The hardware components
consist of the interface device, an assemblage of electronic
parts which serves as a translator between the component
under test and the test equipment and the necessary cables
to connect the interface device to the test equipment.
The F/A-18 program had experienced significant cost
growth in the development of many Test Program Sets for its
complex avionics equipment [Ref. 21:p. 10]. In several
cases, the cost of the manual software development was
greater than the cost of the ATE itself [Ref. 16:p. 3-13].
In an attempt to reduce the escalating cost of these items,
the Support Equipment Division (AIR-552) submitted a
proposal to competitively procure approximately 2 00 Test
Program Sets required for the program. It was estimated
that the total cost of the Test Program Sets for the air-
craft could be reduced by $70 million with no adverse impact
on performance capability or schedule [Ref. 21:p. 27]. In
1982 the Program Management Office made the decision to
authorize competitive procurement of these Test Program Sets




This chapter has reviewed the innovations in support
system development that were instituted with the F/A-18
program. The increasing complexity of modern weapon systems
and their attendant low readiness rates were the primary
impetus behind the philosophy adopted for the F/A-18
program. An emphasis on early planning for support was
employed to attempt to influence the design of the aircraft
toward supportability. A phased support program was
developed to provide an orderly transition from contractor
support to full organic (Navy) support. Establishment of a
Logistics Support Team at NARF North Island provided the
APML with technical support and the ability to manage the
support system from a functional hardware perspective. The
role of the APML was significantly strengthened by his
placement in the funding flow from the PMA to the Logistics
Element Managers. Finally, the competitive procurement of
peculiar support equipment to limit program cost growth was
utilized for the first time.
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IV. EVALUATION OF SUPPORTABILITY INNOVATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of the innovations enumerated in
Chapter III was determined by conducting interviews of key
personnel currently involved with the F/A-18 program. The
perspectives of the three major participants in the
program/ functional matrix with respect to support equipment,
the APML, SPM-SE and PMA were assumed to be the most
knowledgeable evaluators. Because the current F/A-18 PMA
has been with the program only a short while, the Deputy
PMA, who has a long-term history with the program in various
capacities, was consulted. Numerous additional interviews
were conducted both within the Program Management Office and
through the section level of the functional divisions. This
data was compared/contrasted with the material from the
Beran and Decker study [Ref. 6] to reach the conclusions and
recommendations listed in Chapter V.
B. ADVANCE PLANNING FOR SUPPORT
The proven availability of the F/A-18 weapon system
attests to the success of the support planning effort. The
aircraft has already established a reputation for low main-
tenance requirements and ease of maintenance. One example
is the fact that an engine can be changed in the "shadow" of
the aircraft (i.e., minimal support equipment) in less than
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3 minutes. This is an improvement by a factor of two to
four times over existing fighter and attack type aircraft
[Ref. 22]. After two deployments of the aircraft, reliabil-
ity data submitted by fleet units has prompted a recommenda-
tion from NAVAIR that a major maintenance inspection,
conducted every 100 flight hours, be extended to an interval
of 200 flight hours. This adjustment is expected to result
in a reduction of approximately 50 percent in the man-hours
expended on preventative maintenance for the aircraft and an
attendant decrease in support equipment requirements. [Ref.
22]
A particular bright spot, of a technological nature,
resulted from the program's early and continuing emphasis on
support. The inclusion of Built-in Test/Built-in Test
Equipment (BIT/BITE) capability in the aircraft's avionics
equipment has served to reduce fault isolation times and
increase fault isolation accuracy. The success of this
approach has brought about a new way of thinking in AIR-552.
Future support planning efforts of the Support Equipment
Division will be aimed at meeting with the manufacturer of
the component as early as possible in the design review
process in order to influence a design toward improved
BIT/BITE capability as well as supportability . The ultimate
goal will be a component that will fault isolate itself
[Ref. 23]. This is consistent with the established NAVAIR
goals (in descending order of preference) of: [Ref. 23]
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1. No support equipment.
2. The use of common support equipment.
3. Modification of existing common support equipment or
procurement of new peculiar support equipment.
In those items which cannot be made to completely self-test,
emphasis is being placed on utilization of the BIT/BITE by
the ATE as an integral part of the test procedure itself.
This will serve to reduce the complexity of the ATE and also
to reduce fault isolation times.
Another AIR-552 initiative is to encourage performance
of the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) , from which support
equipment requirements are generated, at an earlier point in
the acquisition process. Currently, the LSA is performed in
the Full Scale Development Phase of the acquisition process
when many (up to 90 percent) of the component design varia-
bles are firmly established [Ref. 23]. At this point, any
design changes to influence supportability/testability
become more technically difficult and consequently, more
costly. AIR-552 advocates performing the initial LSA in the
Demonstration and Validation Phase. This will maximize the
opportunity to influence design toward optimization of both
support and performance. [Ref. 23]
An additional concern surrounding the LSA process is the
prompt delivery of the LSA documents for NAVAIR review.
Although the LSA, which is performed by the contractor and
verified by NAVAIR, may be conducted at an earlier point in
the program, this does not guarantee the LSA products will
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be delivered to NAVAIR in a timely fashion. Since the LSA
drives the determination of support equipment requirements,
any delay in the LSA documents will result in a correspond-
ing delay in SE development and delivery. It is imperative
that the Navy set and enforce a firm delivery schedule for
the LSA products [Ref. 23]. The use of contractual
incentives or penalties may be of assistance in this area.
In order to further expedite the support equipment
identification process, an initiative is underway to
organize AIR-552 and the support equipment technical
specialists at NAEC along functional lines such as
propulsion and communication/navigation equipment. This
organization will facilitate attendance of all SE cognizant
personnel at early design reviews.
Also in concert with the theme of early support planning
is the planned utilization of a Support Equipment Candidates
List [Ref. 23]. This document would be prepared in the very
early stages of the support equipment requirements determin-
ation process. It will reflect obvious, known SE require-
ments as agreed upon by both Navy and contractor
representatives. Because preparation of the Support Equip-
ment Candidates List would be significantly less complicated
than the formal determination process, it can be prepared at
an earlier point in the process. This action will provide
an even earlier start on the development and procurement of
known support equipment requirements.
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The RILSD was disestablished in the 1984 time frame
[Ref. 22]. Their initial work on the Logistic Support
Analysis and Maintenance Plan was transferred to NARF North
Island. The NAEC representative for support equipment,
however, is still active at the contractor's facility in St.
Louis. All those interviewed were in agreement as to the
value of the SE representative, especially in the early
stages of the program [Refs. 22, 23]. In addition to
providing technical assistance, the representative is a
valuable aid in expediting government administrative
requirements pertaining to support equipment. The NAEC
representative is still very much a part of the logistics
process and is providing assistance on current problems.
Representative tasks include a program to provide Test
Program Set vendors component update information. The
consensus among current program personnel involved in the
support effort was that all on-site liaison with the
contractor was a valuable asset [Refs. 22, 23]. NAEC
representation at all support equipment contractors has
become standard practice in AIR-552 [REf. 23].
Contract incentives for supportability were termed a
huge success by the current Deputy PMA [Ref. 13]. The
incentive awards were based on reliability and maintainabil-
ity goals. As reliability increases (higher mean time
between failure) and maintainability improves (lower mean
time to repair when a failure does occur) , the requirements
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for all support elements are decreased. The prime contrac-
tor's efforts in improving these areas were so successful
that he was able to earn all of the available reliability
and maintainability incentive awards [Ref. 13]. This acqui-
sition technique was crucial in the design and delivery of
the F/A-18, currently the most reliable and maintainable
aircraft of its type in the fleet [Ref. 13]. As such,
contract incentives for reliability and maintainability (and
therefore supportability) have been adopted by several other
NAVAIR aircraft programs such as the T-45 and the V-22 [Ref.
13] .
Prioritized development of maintenance capabilities was
another technique endorsed by all interviewees. In addition
to the early stages of the development, this technique has
been utilized on a continuing basis throughout the program
as the maintenance levels are developed. Currently, the
priorities of the depot level maintenance tasks are being
reevaluated based on failure rates observed in the fleet.
On some components, the actual failure data is indicating
20,000 to 30,000 hours mean time between failure, much
higher than was originally projected. This has led to
changes in priority on, and in some cases elimination of,
maintenance and testing on these items. [Ref. 22]
This practice has a direct and significant effect on
support equipment. Preliminary mean time between failure
estimates are a major determinant in developing initial SE
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nts. As a consequence, the Navy may be buying SE
above case, Test Program Sets) which it does not
unversely, if the actual MTBF rates are lower than
: estimated, SE requirements would be greater than
ad. The current APML stressed the need to maintain
<" support program, continuously refining require-
rh feedback from the fleet. Corrective actions
adjusting support equipment procurement schedules
jg a task to a higher or lower maintenance level as
] [Ref. 22]
idressed earlier, the F/A-18 program embodied a
csive plan to incrementally transition support
J from the prime contractor to the Navy. The F/A-18
ppport plan was roundly lauded by all personnel
ied. Phased support was credited with "saving" the
jtien difficulties were experienced with the delivery
Program Sets to support ATE (to be discussed in a
]tion) [Ref. 13]. Comments from an earlier F/A-18
Bently Program Director for Tactical Air Programs
( viewed phased support as a necessity for any
pi order to bring the weapon system on-line without
uay [Ref. 24]. The F/A-18 phased support plan was
she especially valuable in that it permitted the
dit of organic support elements to be based on a
fjh level of design maturity, rather than a changing
def. 24]. A widely acknowledged strength of the
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F/A-18 phased support plan was the fact that it had been
planned from the beginning of the aircraft acquisition [Ref.
25] . Overall it was felt that the aircraft could not have
been introduced and maintained the high readiness rates it
has without phased support.
In theory it seems that a conflict may exist for a con-
tractor who, like McDonnell Douglas in the F/A-18 program,
is providing both the interim support and developing
equipment and procedures for organic support. One could
speculate that the contractor may be inclined to delay
development of the organic support in the event of technical
or contractual difficulties with support equipment.
Additional motivations could be a desire to retain the
profit generated by the interim support contract as long as
possible or an unanticipated need to focus resources on the
development of the weapon system, thereby reducing the
effort on support development.
This concept was suggested to F/A-18 PMO personnel, both
past and present, and was unanimously judged to be a highly
unlikely occurrence. The NAVAIR personnel felt that the
major contractors would rather concentrate on selling their
primary products [Ref. 24]. It was felt the contractor
accepted the requirement to perform interim support as a
consequence of selling their product [Refs. 13, 24].
Another view expressed was that the contractor would have
more to lose than gain by delaying development of organic
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support capabilities. The negative risk here being the
contractor gaining a reputation within the military
community as producing a complex system that is difficult to
support with organic assets. [Refs. 22, 24]
D. NARF NORTH ISLAND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TEAM
As stated earlier, the Logistic Support Team was
originally intended to be established at the contractor's
facility in St. Louis. The North Island site was the next
logical choice as it had been designated as the eventual
Cognizant Field Activity for the aircraft.
In the earlier study, the following potential weaknesses
were advanced as to the effectiveness of the Logistic
Support Team at North Island: [Ref. 6:p. 71]
1. Ideally the Logistic Support Team should be physically
located at the contractor's facility.
2. The choice of team members is limited.
3. NARF North Island management goals for the Logistic
Support Team may not be the same as the program goals
for this team.
In reference to location, it was projected the team's
required interaction with other groups in the program sup-
port organization would be difficult to maintain [Ref. 6:p.
72]. In light of the fact that none of the other groups
were on the west coast (APML, LEMs-NAVAIR, NAEC-east coast,
RILSD and contractor personnel in midwest) this view is
easily understandable. This projection has, in fact, proven
true. The extensive travel required and the time difference
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between coasts has significantly reduced the effectiveness
with which the Logistic Support Team can be managed by the
APML [Ref. 22]. Conversely, the above conditions have
lessened the frequency with which the Logistic Support Team
perspective is sought in making routine support system
decisions. [Ref. 22]
Addressing the area of personnel, the earlier study
suggested that the limited pool of personnel available at
the NARF, from which members would be selected, could limit
the effectiveness of the team. This was in contrast to the
make-up of the RILSD, both in this program and those in the
past, whose members were selected from various backgrounds
and organizations. A noted strength of the RILSD was the
broad and balanced spectrum of knowledge and experience
available to accomplish day to day coordination [Ref. 6:p.
72]. No current deficiencies were identified in either the
variety of skills or the competence levels of the personnel
on the NARF team, however, the effectiveness of the team was
found to be highly dependent on the encumbent leadership.
This situation had varied considerably in the past. [Ref.
22]
The projection of conflicting goals between program and
NARF management centered primarily on the dichotomy in time
horizons between the two organizations. The PMO is
obviously concerned with introducing a weapon system to the
fleet that meets performance and supportability goals. It
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was postulated that the NARF Logistic Support Team would
tend toward a longer term perspective and base their
decisions from an overhaul and rework viewpoint [Ref. 6:p.
73]. Primary concerns would be the maintenance and increase
of production levels which in this case would involve depot
level maintenance and rework of the aircraft at prescribed
intervals (usually a period of three to six years)
.
Research conducted for this thesis indicates that this
deficiency may have been realized. One incident that was
related will serve to illustrate the point.
A technique known as age expiration was under considera-
tion for the F/A-18 program. The age expiration technique
bases the decision to rework aircraft at the depot level on
the condition of a sample of aircraft taken from the air-
craft population. This is contrasted to the Standard Depot
Level Maintenance (SDLM) program, which reworks each model
aircraft on a standard service period interval. Both the
sample inspection and aircraft rework are performed by NARF
personnel. A difference of opinion developed over the
appropriate sample size for the F/A-18 between the APML and
NARF North Island [Ref. 22]. The sample size varies
directly with the desired confidence level of the test
(i.e., a 95 percent confidence level would require a larger
sample than a 90 percent confidence level) . The desire of
the APML, in an effort to conserve resources and maintain
the validity of the technique, was to use a sample size at
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the lower end of the acceptable range. The NARF team
strongly advocated a higher confidence level and therefore a
larger sample size, requiring a greater expenditure of time
and funds. Since NARF personnel conduct the sample inspec-
tions, and subsequent rework if necessary, the size of the
aircraft sample is directly related to the workload at the
NARF. One must therefore question the extent to which the
recommendation of the Logistic Support Team has been
influenced by NARF management goals. [Ref. 22]
In summary, the Logistic Support Team at NARF North
Island was found to have minimal impact on logistic support
decisions by the PMO. The location of the team made
communication and coordination difficult and the effective-
ness of the team was found to vary significantly with the
leadership. Additionally, the objectivity of the team was
called into question. These conclusions were in general
agreement with the projections of the earlier study.
E. APML ROLE IN SUPPORT MANAGEMENT
One of the most significant changes in the F/A-18
program from previous aircraft acquisition programs was the
enhancement of the APML role in managing the support system.
This was accomplished by placing the APML in the funding
flow from the PMA to the Logistics Element Managers. The
research conducted for this thesis found the method by which
the APML role was enhanced to be significantly different
than that which was reported by Beran and Decker [Ref. 6].
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In the earlier study, there are numerous references to
funding control by the APML. The control of funds by the
APML is explicitly stated when the "Golden Rule" is refer-
enced [Ref. 6:p. 67]. The "Golden Rule" asserts "He who has
the gold, makes the rules." [Ref. 6:p. 67] This leads the
reader to the conclusion that the APML controls and
disburses program funds to the various logistics elements.
Program fund management, as described above, is in direct
conflict with the current charter of the Program Manager
which states, "The Program manager shall control all funds
approved for the program" [Ref. 5: p. 6]. This version of
the PMA charter was published after the earlier study, but
no individual interviewed could recall APML control of funds
throughout the history of the program.
Although the F/A-18 APML was not given actual control of
support funds for the program, he does wield significant
influence in how the funds are budgeted and distributed.
The APML is in the funding flow in an advisory capacity to
the PMA. In this alignment, the APML and his staff consoli-
date, approve as consistent with the overall support plan,
and submit all support element budget requests to the PMO.
Following funding approval, the APML closely monitors
obligations to ensure support spending is proceeding as
planned. The APML is able to alter the support mix and make
tradeoffs among elements through his inputs to the PMA. The
success of this technique is highly dependent on the PMA.
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It is only through the PMA's insistence and reliance on APML
input that the APML is able to fully integrate the various
support elements through funding.
This management practice was endorsed by all those
interviewed. The current F/A-18 Deputy PMA and a former PMA
both placed high value on the APML role in this process.
The excellent readiness posture of the F/A-18 in the fleet
was in part credited to this management structure [Refs. 13,
24]. Neither considered it an attenuation of PMA authority,
as suggested by the earlier study [Ref. 6]. This is a
reasonable conclusion in that the PMA retains ultimate
control of funds. In fact, both cited the practice as an
area better handled by the APML and one that had improved
overall program management [Refs. 13, 24]. Specifically,
the monitoring function had proven valuable in the early
identification of problem areas and thus gave ample oppor-
tunity to explore alternative methods [Ref. 24]. The
current APML enthusiastically endorsed the concept.
Tradeoffs among support elements and across the board
reductions in funding had been accomplished via this method
on many occasions [Ref. 22]. Short notice budget decisions
were cited as being of higher quality. This was attributed
to the APML's better understanding of relative priorities
within the ILS program as compared to a financial represen-
tative from the Project Management Office. [Ref. 22]
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The logic of this approach seems so sound that it is
surprising that it was not used on programs prior to the
F/A-18. One possible explanation is again indicative of the
commitment to support on the F/A-18 program. On this
program, while the APML is charged with screening and
monitoring support element expenditures, he is also
adeguately staffed to perform this function. Currently, the
financial management task in the F/A-18 APML staff involves
a full time Supply Corps officer and several contractors
performing record keeping tasks to manage a budget in excess
of $500 million per year [Ref. 22]. In the past (and on
several other current programs) the APML was not sufficient-
ly staffed to perform these functions. [Ref. 22]
Another area investigated in the Beran and Decker work
concerned the organizational effects that may have resulted
from the enhancement of the APML role in support management.
In reference to support eguipment, it was theorized that the
change in the APML role would be perceived as a diminution
of the role of the System Program Manager for Support Equip-
ment [Ref. 6:p. 66]. Additionally, because of the fact the
APML is organized under AIR-04 and the SPM-SE is organized
under AIR-05, it was thought any conflict resulting from the
change would be difficult to resolve across organizational
lines [Ref. 6:p. 70]. It was not possible to ascertain if
these problems were a factor in the very early years of the
program. None of those interviewed for this thesis could
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recall any difficulties with the arrangement dating back to
the 1979-1980 time frame [Refs. 13, 23]. The principal
member of the organization affected, the current SPM-SE,
strongly endorsed the APML role in funds management as
currently configured [Ref. 23]. This is consistent with the
fact that the APML does not control any funds, but rather
screens requests and makes recommendations. If a conflict
does arise relative to support equipment funding, the SPM-
SE, chartered with responsibility for all NAVAIR SE
programs, can take his case directly to the PMA. Also, the
motivation of the APML to unfairly recommend restriction or
reduction of support equipment funding must be questioned.
The APML is responsible for ensuring an adequate support
system for the aircraft by balancing the support elements.
If he arbitrarily recommends cuts in SE, he cuts support
[Ref. 23]. A movement toward stronger enhancement of the
APML role in future programs was predicted, to include
eventual APML control and disbursement of support funds.
[Ref. 23]
F. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT OF PECULIAR SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
Competition has been successfully employed in the
procurement of common support equipment for many years.
Typically the required common support equipment is a proven
product with little or no development involved [Ref. 26:p.
46]. Peculiar support equipment, on the other hand, is
unique to a particular aircraft or system and usually
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requires extensive development. As a consequence of its
unique nature, of the over 3000 peculiar support equipment
design and development programs in progress, virtually all
are with the weapon system prime contractor. [Ref. 26 :p.
49]
As mentioned earlier, the F/A-18 program had experienced
significant cost growth in a particular area of PSE develop-
ment—that of Test Program Sets (TPS) to interface the air-
craft's avionics components with existing and new Automatic
Test Equipment (ATE) . In response, a decision was made to
competitively procure a portion of the TPS requirements.
This was the first time in any NAVAIR aircraft program that
PSE was to be competed. [Ref. 23]
The results of the TPS competition have been less than
successful [Refs. 13, 22, 23]. The dissatisfaction within
the program centers around the consistent late delivery of
the Test Program Sets. The decision to compete this
equipment was made in 1982. As of late 1986, no TPS had
been delivered on schedule and the majority of those that
had been delivered were in a pre-production configuration
[Ref. 22]. Those in the pre-production configuration have
little of their ILS system in place and normally require a
technical representative of the manufacturer to operate
them. [Ref. 22]
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A common theme was found in the research conducted on
the TPS procurement. The shortcomings in this area centered
around three topics:
1. Technical data, in the form of Test Requirements
Documents (TRD)
.
2. Samples of the components which the TPS is designed to
interface with, known as the Unit Under Test (UUT)
.
3. The ability to upgrade the individual TPS to match the
upgrade of its respective avionics component.
Test Requirements Documents contain the full technical
data package applicable to a particular component.
Typically the documents contain circuits, schematics, and
all required test parameters. In the case of TPS develop-
ment, a data package is required for each component a TPS is
designed to test. This presented a significant management
problem for AIR-552. While collecting and distributing the
data packages for 200 Test Program Sets does not seem over-
whelming, this task was complicated by the fact that three
different manufacturers were contracted to develop and
produce the sets, resulting in three different data package
requirements. An additional complicating factor that was
not anticipated was erroneous data. Any TRD that was in
error and provided to a developer would result in a Test
Program Set that would not function properly. The task of
ensuring all data was screened for accuracy imposed a
substantial workload on AIR-552 [Ref. 23]. On previous
programs, where PSE was procured sole source from the prime
contractor, these tasks were performed by the prime.
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Samples of the components to be tested, Units Under
Test, are essential to TPS development. The primary problem
in this area concerned the fact that the decision to compete
the TPS development was made at a later point in the program
than when spares requirements were identified [Ref. 23].
Consequently, dedicated components for TPS development were
not procured. The program has had to draw from any
opportune source in order to overcome this deficiency.
Currently, two production aircraft are in long term storage
at NARF Jacksonville, Florida, with the required components
removed. The sole reason for these aircraft to be in this
status, and expected to remain that way for approximately
one year, is to provide Units Under Test for TPS develop-
ment [Ref. 22]. On previous programs, with the prime
managing TPS development, this problem was easily solved by
pulling the required components from the production line.
[Ref. 23]
A contributing factor to both schedule delay and
increased cost was the failure to include in the TPS
development contract a provision to update the Test Program
Sets as the avionics components in the aircraft were
improved [Ref. 22]. Several examples were cited where the
components have ben upgraded four or five times before the
TPS for the original version has been delivered [Ref. 22].
In most cases the TPS for the original component will not
correctly test the updated components. Corrective actions
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range from a simple publications change to document a change
in testing procedure to a complete rewrite of the software
portion of the TRS. Some TPS modifications involving
software rewrites have amounted to 60 percent to 90 percent
of the cost of the original TPS. [Ref. 27]
Another related problem area in TPS development is
configuration control of Automatic Test Equipment [Ref. 23].
Improvements are frequently proposed and incorporated in the
test equipment itself. It can be easily seen that with the
TPS required to interact with both the component and the
ATE, a complex situation can rapidly develop when both con-
figurations are changing. Because NAVAIR provided the ATE
to the TPS developers in the competitive arrangement, it was
responsible for ensuring updates were processed and incor-
porated promptly. [Ref. 23]. This task also had previously
been accomplished by the prime contractor.
In summary, the problems associated with the TPS compe-
tition involve NAVAIR assumption of tasks formerly performed
by the prime contractor. The competition did yield some
benefits. The competitive price of the package was approxi-
mately half that of procurement solely from the prime [Ref.
23]. This has established a new market price for future TPS
development. However, what AIR-552 saved in development
costs was bought with an assumption of management tasks and
responsibilities. Program delays resulted from a failure to
anticipate the complexity of directing three competitors and
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a lack of advance planning on other related issues. One
ripple effect of this situation has been a necessary
extension of the phased support plan [Ref. 13]. it is
interesting to note that the Beran and Decker study-
projected that the management tasks associated with
competitive procurement of PSE would be formidable and
probably result in schedule delays [Ref. 6:p. 75]. As a
result of the problems encountered in this area, the F/A-18
program has elected not to participate in further PSE
competition [Ref. 22]. On the remaining lots of Test
Program Sets to be developed, the PMA has directed AIR-552
to contract with McDonnell Douglas directly. [Ref. 13]
G. OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
The earlier study pointed out a potential weakness in
the matrix structure. While the functional groups are
normally headed by an admiral, the PMA is usually a Navy
captain or a Marine Corps colonel. Because the functional
divisions remain organizationally in line with the
functional group, it was contended the functional group
director could exert considerable influence over an
individual program's operations. [Ref. 6: p. 49]
No evidence was found to indicate this behavior had ever
been a consideration in the F/A-18 program. The current PMA
was well satisfied with the program/ functional matrix
concept [Ref. 13]. No significant conflicts had been
experienced between the PMO and the functional
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groups/divisions [Ref. 13]. In addition, it was pointed out
the PMA charter stated that in the event of a conflict the
functional divisions would support the PMA decision until
the situation was resolved by higher authority [Ref. 13].
It seems clear that a teamwork approach pervades the matrix
organization in the support area and that the F/A-18 program
is recognized as a NAVAIR program, not strictly an endeavor
of the Program Management Office.
A significant change was also instituted concerning the
Integrated Logistic Support Management Team (ILSMT) for the
aircraft itself, mentioned in Chapter II. The F/A-18
Integrated Logistic Support Plan states, "The primary
management vehicle of the ILS program is the ILSMT, which
serves to monitor and control the execution of overall
program requirements" [Ref. 17:p. 2-5]. The earlier study
proposed that the "monitor" function would be assumed by the
Logistic Support Team at NARF North Island and the "control"
function by the APML [Ref. 6:p. 66]. The control function
has been effectively assumed by the APML. Although the
Logistic Support Team has not emerged to be as strong a
participant as originally planned, their work has enabled
the ILSMT role to be reduced. Currently, the ILSMT meetings
have been consolidated with safety and engineering meetings
to form a single SEAL (Safety, Engineering and Logistics)
meeting [Ref. 22]. Many of the same people were attending
all three meetings and, in the APML's opinion, the dedicated
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ILSMT meetings of the past had been unproductive, concen-
trating primarily on status briefs of current ILS issues.
Consolidation was viewed as a means to reduce travel
requirements, and to increase interaction between the three
groups and with fleet personnel. The SEAL meeting format
has been in effect for approximately one year and has
already yielded benefits in the form of an increased focus
on action items generated from fleet inputs, decreased time
commitments on the part of the members, and enhanced inter-
action between disciplines. [Refs. 13, 22]
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The success of the F/A-18 approach to support system
planning and management cannot be disputed. The aircraft
itself has brought about a new mode of operation for fleet
maintenance managers and technicians, where reliable and
easy to maintain systems are the rule rather than the
exception. The management innovations implemented with this
program have set a standard for other programs to follow.
Early consideration of support reguirements and the
opportunity to influence component design toward supporta-
bility are crucial aspects of a successful program. Phased
support, coupled with prioritized development of maintenance
capabilities, permits synchronization of the design maturity
of the support system with that of the aircraft.
In order to provide accountability and a single point of
responsibility, it is desirable that the PMA retain control
of all program funds. However, to truly manage the develop-
ment of the support system, the APML must have the ability
to influence PMO decisions regarding the individual support
elements. The APML can accomplish this through participa-
tion in the funding flow as established in the F/A-18
program. To effectively perform this tasking, the APML must
be adeguately staffed.
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While the competitive procurement of peculiar support
equipment can substantially lower equipment costs (50
percent in the case of the F/A-18 Test Program Sets)
,
it
entails the assumption of a substantial management workload
which must be adequately planned and provided for.
The program/ functional matrix is well conceived and
structured. There is no evidence in the F/A-18 program that
conflict has occurred between the functional divisions and
the PMO. If conflict does arise, the procedures to handle
it are well documented. The interplay of program and func-
tional responsibilities adds strength to the organization.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recommendation 1
The emphasis on early support planning and design
for supportability should be continued. All methods by
which support equipment requirements can be identified at an
earlier point in the acquisition cycle should be pursued.
This is to include initiation of the Logistic Support
Analysis during the Concept Exploration stage and the use of
the Support Equipment Candidates List. The inclusion of
these methods in a program proposal should be adopted as one
of the criteria to be evaluated during the source selection
process. The design for support effort should strive for
the utilization of BIT/BITE capability wherever feasible.
The prompt establishment of the RILSD, to include a
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dedicated support equipment representative, is a proven




Contract incentives for support are integral to
adequate support system development and should be used on
all aircraft weapon systems acquisition contracts. To
effectively administer the incentive program, the awards
should be based on quantitative goals such as reliability
and maintainability. Also, the awards should be determined
on data that are collected in the operational environment
with maintenance performed by Navy personnel.
3 Recommendation 3
Phased support for the introduction of new weapon
systems should be adopted as standard practice in NAVAIR.
This concept must be planned from the initiation of the
program and include provisions for the transition of both
maintenance and supply support. The rate at which the
various maintenance levels transition should be based on the
rate of design maturity of the aircraft. The possibility
that a prime contractor would intentionally delay the
development of organic maintenance capabilities for his own
gain is considered remote.
4 Recommendation 4
The establishment of a team to assist in logistics
management at a location other than the manufacturer's
facility should not be considered. Placement of the support
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team at another location, especially when a substantial
geographic separation exists, places them outside the
logistics decision making process. Organization of the team
to enable management by aircraft functional system can yield
benefits and should be pursued if the team can be
established at the contractor's facility.
5. Recommendation 5
The APML should be directly involved in funding
decisions for the support elements in order to provide a
balanced approach to ILS. To accomplish this, the APML must
be adequately staffed. In order to ensure a single point of
control and accountability, the F/A-18 program method is
preferred over a procedural change which would give the APML
actual control of the funds.
6. Recommendation 6
The efforts to competitively procure peculiar
support equipment should continue. The planning and manage-
ment problems encountered on the F/A-18 program can be
applied to improve the chances for success on future





The program functional/matrix organization in NAVAIR
should be retained. The structure is well established and
able to accomplish program goals efficiently. The potential
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for conflict between program management and functional




Integrated Logistic Support is defined as a "disci-
plined, unified, and iterative approach to the management
and technical activities necessary to: [Ref. 28 :p. 2-2]
a. Integrate support considerations into system and
equipment design.
b. Develop support requirements that are related consis-
tently to readiness, objectives to design, and to each
other.
c. Acquire the required support.
d. Provide the required support during the operational
phase at minimum cost.
In response to an acknowledged requirement for a more
thorough approach to logistics planning, the Navy issued
Weapon Requirement-3 (WR-30) entitled "Integrated Mainte-
nance Management for Aeronautical Weapons, Weapon Systems
and Related Equipment," in 1963 [Ref. 6:p. 84]. The ILS
concept was further established throughout DOD with the
issuance of DOD Directive 4100.35, "Development of
Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and Equipment" in
the following year. NAVAIR ILS program requirements for ILS
were promulgated in Aeronautical Requirement-3 (AR-3 0)
,
published in 1969 and further refined in AR-30A, published
in 1971. The most recent Department of Defense ILS guidance
is DOD Directive 5000.39 of 1983, "Acquisition and
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t of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and
." This document is significant in that it states:
selection evaluation criteria for appropriate
tive programs shall include a separate evaluation
(separate from schedule, cost, and performance) for
ss and support, weighted to ensure a positive
on contractor selection and contract award.
ed the first DOD publication where logistic support
recognized on an equal basis with cost, schedule,
>rmance with reference to source selection. DOD
5000.39 was implemented in its entirety throughout
by Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST)
in 1986. In addition to the precepts published in
Directive, SECNAVINST 5000. 39A further emphasized
tance of logistic support in program management:
agers and other professional logistics personnel
e afforded equality of grade and rank with other
ional personnel engaged in other equally important
f acquisition such as design engineering, produc-
Dntracts management, financial management, etc.
irective 4100.35 was the first government publica-
.dentify the primary elements of logistic support
i. 84]. Because ILS is an evolving discipline,
been some disagreement in the literature on the
inition of the ILS elements. The ILS Elements as
DOD Directive 5000.39 and SECNAVINST 5000. 39A are
itenance Planning . The process conducted to evolve
establish maintenance concepts and requirements
the lifetime of a material system.
lower and Personnel . The identification and acqui-
on of military and civilian personnel with the
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skills and grades required to operate and support a
material system over its lifetime at peacetime and
wartime rates.
3. Supply Support . All management actions, procedures,
and techniques used to determine requirements to
acquire, catalog, receive, store, transfer, issue and
dispose of secondary items. This includes provision-
ing for initial support as well as replenishment
supply support.
4. Support Equipment . All equipment (mobile or fixed)
required to support the operation and maintenance of a
material system. This includes associated multiuse
end items, ground-handling and maintenance equipment,
tools, metrology and calibration equipment, test
equipment, and automatic test equipment. It includes
the acquisition of logistic support for the support
and test equipment itself.
5. Technical Data . Recorded information regardless of
form or character (such as manuals and drawings) of a
scientific or technical nature. Computer programs and
related software are not technical data; documentation
of computer programs and related software are. Also
excluded are financial data or other information
related to contract administration.
6. Training and Training Support . The processes, proce-
dures, techniques, training devices and equipment used
to train civilian and active duty and reserve military
personnel to operate and support a material system.
This includes individual and crew training; new equip-
ment training; initial, formal, and on-the-job train-
ing; and logistic support planning for training
equipment and training device acquisitions and
installations
.
7. Computer Resources Support . The facilities, hardware,
software, documentation, manpower and personnel needed
to operate and support embedded computer systems.
8. Facilities . The permanent or semipermanent real
property assets required to support the material sys-
tem, including conducting studies to define types of
facilities or facility improvements, locations, space
needs, environmental requirements, and equipment.
9. Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation . The
resources, processes, procedures, design considera-
tions, and methods to ensure that all system, equip-
ment, and support items are preserved, packaged,
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handled, and transported properly, including environ-
mental considerations, equipment preservation require-
ments for short- and long-term storage, and
transportability.
10. Design Interface . The relationship of logistics-
related design parameters, such as R&M, to readiness
and support resource requirements. These logistics-
related design parameters are expressed in operational
terms rather than as inherent values and specifically
relate to system readiness objectives and support
costs of the material system.
The ILS process can be divided into several different
sections. This appendix will discuss four primary actions
undertaken during the ILS process, listed as follows:
1. Definition of the system maintenance concept.
2. The Integrated Logistic Support Plan.
3. Logistic Support Analysis.
4. The maintenance plan for the system.
A. SYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
"System support must be considered on an integrated
basis from the beginning if the ultimate product is to be
cost-effective. This is initially accomplished through the
definition of a system maintenance concept, which evolves
from the definition of system operational requirements. The
maintenance concept basically describes in general terms the
overall system support environment in which the system is to
exist, and constitutes the baseline for the determination of
specific logistic support requirements through the Logistic
Support Analysis. More specifically, the maintenance
concept serves the following purposes:
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1. It provides the basis for the establishment of suppor-
tability requirements in system/equipment design. It
also provides design criteria for major elements of
logistic support (e.g. , test and support equipment,
spares, facilities, etc.). For instance, if the
repair policy dictates that no external test and sup-
port equipment is allowed at the operational site,
then the prime equipment design must incorporate some
provision for built-in self-test.
2. It provides for the establishment of requirements for
total logistic support. The maintenance concept,
supplemented by the logistic support analysis, leads
to the identification of maintenance tasks, task fre-
quencies and times, personnel quantities and skill
levels, test and support equipment, spare/repair
parts, facilities, and other resources.
3. It provides a basis for detailing the maintenance plan
and impacts upon the supply concept, training concept,
supplier/customer services, phased logistic support,
transportation and handling criteria, and production
data needs.
Fulfillment of these purposes in an effective and economical
manner requires that the maintenance concept be developed
initially in conjunction with the definition of operational
requirements at . the inception of a program, and updated as
the program develops. Primary considerations for the system
maintenance concept are the levels of maintenance (i.e.,
organizational, intermediate, and depot) to be used in main-
taining the system, and repair policy (the anticipated
extent to which repair of an equipment item will be accom-
plished, if at all)" [Ref. 15:pp. 104-105]. The formulation
of these fundamental logistic concepts and policies permits
initiation of the Integrated Logistic Support Plan.
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B. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT PLAN
"The complexity of integrating the logistic support of
an item of equipment or system varies, and depends upon:
the size of the program; funding available; time to complete
the program; personnel and organizations associated with ILS
planning; technology involved; etc. In order to reduce any
complications which may arise because of these factors, it
is imperative that an ILS Plan (ILSP) be developed early in
the acquisition to guide the ILS Manager and other ILS
participants and to ensure that the total integration of
logistic design, development, and production of equipments
and systems are accomplished in a timely, and effective
manner. For DOD programs, a plan is required for all new
and modified systems and equipment which are acquired.
An ILS Plan should contain all basic information which
is necessary to undertake the procurement of an item of
equipment or a system. The function of the ILSP is to
identify what Integrated Logistic Support tasks will be
accomplished, who will be responsible for their accomplish-
ment, and how and when they will be accomplished. It also
provides the foundation for coordinated action on the part
of the Logistic Element Managers and the contractor, and
documents the manner in which each of the applicable
elements of logistic support is to be obtained, integrated
with the other elements and sustained throughout the life
cycle. Included are milestones, delivery points, names and
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specific responsibilities of persons accountable for each
element, basic guidance on the logistic system desired,
relationships and interdependencies among the personnel, and
monitoring or communications systems to pass information
among participants. The ILSP should continue to undergo
evolutionary changes as the program progresses to keep it
current, useful, and in balance with the rest of the
program.
While the format and length of the Integrated Logistic
Support Plan may vary with the program, the following items
should be considered and discussed as applicable:
1. The identification of each organization assisting the
Integrated Logistic Support Manager in the overall
planning for acquisition of logistics resources,
including names or codes of assigned representatives
together with a concise statement of their
responsibilities.
2. The methods of communication among all participants in
the ILS planning process, to ensure that all parties
are fully informed of the current status of all other
elements. Coordination is of prime importance to the
successful achievement of Integrated Logistic Support
Planning.
3. A listing of all the logistic support elements, the
scope of concern with, and the planning for each at
the various stages in the evolution of the system or
equipment.
4. A specific approach for performing trade-offs between
logistic support elements as well as between logistic
support and design. Examples include repair versus
throw-away and preventative versus corrective
maintenance.
5. The extent to which Level of Repair Analysis (LOR)
will be applied.
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e programming, budgeting, and funding for both the
nning for ILS and subsequent acquisition of support
ources.
merging of maintainability and reliability
uirements into the Integrated Logistic Support
nning process.
Specific requirement for, and a description of, the
pe of the Logistic Support Analysis to be
omplished.
Sntification of an appropriate management control
appraisal system for evaluation of logistic sup-
t milestones.
ICievement of the established Navy Support date for
system/equipment. The need for contractor support
uld be considered. Detailed requirements for a
nsition plan ensuring a smooth transition from con-
ctor support to Navy Support or other transfer of
istic support responsibilities should be included
applicable.
Theshould be a dynamic, detailed document delineating
thejram Manager's (and therefore the Logistics
Man) plan for ensuring timely, adequate, cost
eff logistic support of the system/equipment" [Ref.
29:-30] .
C. riC SUPPORT ANALYSIS
Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) of an item of
equ or system is the method by which the feasibility
of enting the maintenance concept is determined. The
LSAlso the means by which almost all of the other
logsupport resources are determined.
Logistics Support Analysis is the controlling
anal effort within the ILS program. It is utilized by
ILSement to provide a continual dialogue between the
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designer and the logistician, which will result in the
acquisition of an operationally effective, supportable
system/equipment at an optimum life cycle cost. Engineering
techniques are applied during an analysis to determine
optimum design characteristics for minimum logistic burden
of the end item and its support systems, and to identify the
total support resources required by the system/equipment.
The LSA process provides for specific consideration of
operator as well as maintenance requirements, and injects
system support criteria into the design process earlier in
the acquisition cycle. A continuous dialogue should be
maintained between engineer and logistician as an inherent
part of system development. This relationship maximizes
possibilities for early identification of problems, thus
forcing design versus support trade-off decisions before the
design is finalized. LSA efforts during the program
initiation phases are of special importance, having the
potential for major impacts on design, systems supporta-
bility, and life cycle costs." [Ref. 29:pp. 73-74]
"The LSA is a composite of systematic actions taken to
identify, define, analyze, quantify, and process logistic
support requirements. The analysis evolves as the develop-
ment program progresses. The number and type of iterative
analysis vary according to the program schedule and
complexity. As the LSA evolves, records should be
maintained to provide the basis for logistic constraints,
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identification of design deficiencies, and identification
and development of essential logistic support resources.
Initially the LSA should develop qualitative and quanti-
tative logistic support objectives. As the program
progresses, these objectives should be refined into design
parameters for use in design/cost/operational
availability/capability trade-offs, risk analyses and
development of logistic support capabilities. The initial
effort evaluates effects of alternative hardware designs on
support costs and operational readiness. Known scarcities,
constraints or logistic risks will be identified, and
methods for overcoming or minimizing these problems will be
developed.
During design, analysis should be oriented toward
assisting the designer in incorporating logistic require-
ments into hardware design. The goal is to create an
optimum system or item of equipment that meets the specifi-
cation and is most cost effective over its planned life
cycle. Logistics deficiencies identified as design evolves
become considerations in trade-off studies. Periodically
the design and the hardware should be subjected to a formal
appraisal to verify supportability features, such as
accessibility and compatibility of test equipment, as
specified in the contract.
As the program progresses, and designs become fixed, the
LSA process concentrates on providing timely, valid data for
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all areas of ILS; e.g., maintenance, provisioning, personnel
and training and technical publications.
The detailed requirements for a particular LSA should be
tailored by the procuring activity to suit the specific
characteristics of the system/equipment. The magnitude,
scope and level of detail should be consistent with the
stage of development. Less than major acquisitions,
including off-the-shelf items may be subjected to an LSA of
appropriately reduced range and depth, but sufficient data
for off-the-shelf items should be provided to allow complete
identification of logistics requirements." [Ref. 29:pp. 84-
85]
1. Level of Repair Analysis
"Level of Repair Analysis (LOR) is an integral part
of the Logistic Support Analysis. LOR Analysis consists of
non-economic and economic iterative evaluations used to
establish the maintenance level at which an item will be
replaced, repaired, or discarded. The economic evaluation
considers cost factors pertaining to inventories, support
and test equipment, space requirements, labor and training
documentation
.
Since repair level determination provides the basis
for maintenance planning, the application of economic and
non-economic analyses to specific items will be determined
as early as possible. Initially, level of repair determina-
tions may be tentatively assigned based upon engineering
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studies and evaluations without consideration of economic
factors. Later in the acquisition cycle, selected items
should be subjected to Initial Economic LOR Analysis to
isolate items which should clearly be designed for discard
from those that may be designed for repair. The economic
LOR process is iterative until the Final Economic LOR
Analysis, which should be completed prior to provisioning
for the system. The systematic procedures required to
conduct an effective determination of whether a given item
should be repaired or discarded, and the maintenance level
at which the most cost effective repair can be accomplished,
are specified in MIL-STD-1390B (Navy)
.
Since the design of equipment is influenced by many
individuals having responsibilities in such areas as
performance, reliability, maintainability, and safety, the
LOR criteria applied by these individuals may not be easily
converted into economic quantities. These non-economic LOR
analyses should not be directly under the control of the
Program Manager or the Logistics Manager. Management will
thus hear arguments for repair or discard based on intangi-
bles which will sometimes vary from decisions recommended by
the economic LOR analyst. In such cases the economic
analyst will normally be required to demonstrate the
economic pros and cons in order that management decisions
may be made with full cognizance of the cost impact of the
alternative. Factors to be considered in making the
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non-economic LOR recommendations include system vulnerabili-





"Support synthesis is the identification, descrip-
tion and assembly of all support approaches into alternative
support systems for examination in trade-off analyses.
Support synthesis should be used to provide an organized
basis for the examination and selection of the support
system that best provides economical, effective support of
mission requirements. Each support parameter should be
considered within constraints imposed by operational
requirements and cost effectiveness." [Ref. 31:p. 91]
3 Trade-off Analysis
"The trade-off analysis should be a part of the
continuous dialogue between support and design personnel
which is an inherent part of system development. Optimum
benefits are realized when this analysis identifies problems
and causes design versus support trade-off decisions before
the design is finalized. The nature of the trade-off models
or special techniques to be used and the magnitude, scope
and level of detail of the analysis should depend upon the
phase of the program and the system complexity. Trade-offs
early in the program should be interdisciplinary and broad
in scope. Restraints will be based upon the cost, delivery
schedule, and gross estimates of operational capability and
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system concepts. As development progresses, trade-offs are
progressively refined. Inputs become increasingly more
specific and outputs influence a smaller number of related
parameters. Trade-offs between support alternatives
identified during support synthesis and equipment design
parameters are made to provide an effective, economical
support system which best satisfies system operational
requirements." [Ref. 31:pp. 91-92]
4 . System Impact Review
"Reviews to determine impacts of the proposed
system/equipment on the existing logistic and operational
systems of the Service concerned should be performed.
Conversely, impacts of the proposed support system on the
system/equipment under development are continuously examined
throughout the LSA. Interface requirements which necessi-
tate changes to existing systems should be identified and
entered into system requirements documentation, e.g.,
specifications, standards and maintenance manuals. This
analysis assures that the support system for the
system/equipment under development is not designed as a
separate entity, but that its design evolves in parallel
with existing logistic systems and the development of the
end item. Early system impact review accomplishes the first
mating of the system performance requirements with the
requirements of the Service's overall logistics system. The
concepts, policies, and principles established by operations
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and logistic support studies form the constraints of the
support system design, and must be compatible with mission
and effectiveness requirements of the system/equipment.
These concepts, policies, and principles dictate allowable
logistics resources and are the basis for statements of
early requirements." [Ref. 31: pp. 94-95]
5. LSA Outputs
"Information developed by the LSA determines
logistic support requirements. The LSA process is also a
source of logistics data applied to the system design effort
in the form of design constraints recommended for improving
maintainability and supportability. LSA provides data for
risk analyses, effectiveness studies and system trade-off
studies.
The LSA provides qualitative and quantitative data
used for provisioning, maintenance planning, facilities
design, technical publications, support system engineering,
personnel and training plans, and the Packaging, Handling,
Storage and Transportability Program.
More specifically, LSA documentation identifies and
describes support and test equipment; facilities require-
ments; personnel required by skill, type and number; spares
and repair parts; and quantification of maintenance and
operational support needs." [Ref. 31: p. 87]
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6 . Logistic Support Analysis Record
"The method of documenting the LSA is the Logistic
Support Analysis Record (LSAR) . The LSAR is established and
maintained by the contractor as a single source of
validated, integrated design-related logistics data
pertaining to the acquisition program. It also includes
non-design related data used in requirements determination,
acquisition, and distribution of support resources. This
record identifies the logistic support resources required
for a specific system, equipment, component, or lower level
repairable item. The LSAR integrates the various elements
of ILS by considering the elements and the interfaces among
them as a single entity in relation to the overall system.
The LSAR insures that support is planned and that each
element of logistic support is identified and verified by
engineering analysis. This assurance of coordinated action
is the heart of integrated logistic support." [Ref. 29: pp.
74-75]
D. MAINTENANCE PLAN
"The maintenance plan refers to the overall plan for
system/equipment support, primarily from the technical
requirements point of view. Specifically, it may include a
description of the recommended levels of maintenance, the
responsibilities for maintenance (producer versus consumer
functions) , the specific elements of logistic support at
each level, the overall distribution and flow of support
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items, and so on. Where the system maintenance concept is
primarily a 'before-the-fact' input to the design process,
the detailed maintenance plan is based on the results of
design (i.e., a given system design configuration with
supporting analysis data)
.
The maintenance plan, while evolving from the
maintenance concept defined in the early program phases,
stems from the results of the Logistic Support Analysis and
is updated periodically throughout the detail design phases.
It covers the initial distribution of prime eguipment and
the elements of support, interim producer or contractor
support of the system, the procedures associated with the
ongoing sustaining system support throughout the planned
life cycle, the procedures for system upgrading and the
installation of modification kits in the field, and so on.
The maintenance plan attempts to integrate and summarize
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studies and evaluations without consideration of economic
factors. Later in the acquisition cycle, selected items
should be subjected to Initial Economic LOR Analysis to
isolate items which should clearly be designed for discard
from those that may be designed for repair. The economic
LOR process is iterative until the Final Economic LOR
Analysis, which should be completed prior to provisioning
for the system. The systematic procedures required to
conduct an effective determination of whether a given item
should be repaired or discarded, and the maintenance level
at which the most cost effective repair can be accomplished,
are specified in MIL-STD-1390B (Navy)
.
Since the design of equipment is influenced by many
individuals having responsibilities in such areas as
performance, reliability, maintainability, and safety, the
LOR criteria applied by these individuals may not be easily
converted into economic quantities. These non-economic LOR
analyses should not be directly under the control of the
Program Manager or the Logistics Manager. Management will
thus hear arguments for repair or discard based on intangi-
bles which will sometimes vary from decisions recommended by
the economic LOR analyst. In such cases the economic
analyst will normally be required to demonstrate the
economic pros and cons in order that management decisions
may be made with full cognizance of the cost impact of the
alternative. Factors to be considered in making the
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non-economic LOR recommendations include system vulnerabili-





"Support synthesis is the identification, descrip-
tion and assembly of all support approaches into alternative
support systems for examination in trade-off analyses.
Support synthesis should be used to provide an organized
basis for the examination and selection of the support
system that best provides economical, effective support of
mission requirements. Each support parameter should be
considered within constraints imposed by operational
requirements and cost effectiveness." [Ref. 31:p. 91]
3 Trade-off Analysis
"The trade-off analysis should be a part of the
continuous dialogue between support and design personnel
which is an inherent part of system development. Optimum
benefits are realized when this analysis identifies problems
and causes design versus support trade-off decisions before
the design is finalized. The nature of the trade-off models
or special techniques to be used and the magnitude, scope
and level of detail of the analysis should depend upon the
phase of the program and the system complexity. Trade-offs
early in the program should be interdisciplinary and broad
in scope. Restraints will be based upon the cost, delivery
schedule, and gross estimates of operational capability and
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system concepts. As development progresses, trade-offs are
progressively refined. Inputs become increasingly more
specific and outputs influence a smaller number of related
parameters. Trade-offs between support alternatives
identified during support synthesis and equipment design
parameters are made to provide an effective, economical
support system which best satisfies system operational
requirements. 11 [Ref. 31:pp. 91-92]
4 . System Impact Review
"Reviews to determine impacts of the proposed
system/equipment on the existing logistic and operational
systems of the Service concerned should be performed.
Conversely, impacts of the proposed support system on the
system/equipment under development are continuously examined
throughout the LSA. Interface requirements which necessi-
tate changes to existing systems should be identified and
entered into system requirements documentation, e.g.,
specifications, standards and maintenance manuals. This
analysis assures that the support system for the
system/equipment under development is not designed as a
separate entity, but that its design evolves in parallel
with existing logistic systems and the development of the
end item. Early system impact review accomplishes the first
mating of the system performance requirements with the
requirements of the Service's overall logistics system. The
concepts, policies, and principles established by operations
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and logistic support studies form the constraints of the
support system design, and must be compatible with mission
and effectiveness requirements of the system/equipment.
These concepts, policies, and principles dictate allowable
logistics resources and are the basis for statements of
early requirements." [Ref. 31:pp. 94-95]
5. LSA Outputs
"Information developed by the LSA determines
logistic support requirements. The LSA process is also a
source of logistics data applied to the system design effort
in the form of design constraints recommended for improving
maintainability and supportability. LSA provides data for
risk analyses, effectiveness studies and system trade-off
studies.
The LSA provides qualitative and quantitative data
used for provisioning, maintenance planning, facilities
design, technical publications, support system engineering,
personnel and training plans, and the Packaging, Handling,
Storage and Transportability Program.
More specifically, LSA documentation identifies and
describes support and test equipment; facilities require-
ments; personnel required by skill, type and number; spares
and repair parts; and quantification of maintenance and
operational support needs." [Ref. 31:p. 87]
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6. Logistic Support Analysis Record
"The method of documenting the LSA is the Logistic
Support Analysis Record (LSAR) . The LSAR is established and
maintained by the contractor as a single source of
validated, integrated design-related logistics data
pertaining to the acguisition program. It also includes
non-design related data used in requirements determination,
acquisition, and distribution of support resources. This
record identifies the logistic support resources required
for a specific system, equipment, component, or lower level
repairable item. The LSAR integrates the various elements
of ILS by considering the elements and the interfaces among
them as a single entity in relation to the overall system.
The LSAR insures that support is planned and that each
element of logistic support is identified and verified by
engineering analysis. This assurance of coordinated action
is the heart of integrated logistic support." [Ref. 29: pp.
74-75]
D. MAINTENANCE PLAN
"The maintenance plan refers to the overall plan for
system/equipment support, primarily from the technical
requirements point of view. Specifically, it may include a
description of the recommended levels of maintenance, the
responsibilities for maintenance (producer versus consumer
functions) , the specific elements of logistic support at
each level, the overall distribution and flow of support
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items, and so on. Where the system maintenance concept is
primarily a 'before-the-fact' input to the design process,
the detailed maintenance plan is based on the results of
design (i.e., a given system design configuration with
supporting analysis data)
.
The maintenance plan, while evolving from the
maintenance concept defined in the early program phases,
stems from the results of the Logistic Support Analysis and
is updated periodically throughout the detail design phases.
It covers the initial distribution of prime eguipment and
the elements of support, interim producer or contractor
support of the system, the procedures associated with the
ongoing sustaining system support throughout the planned
life cycle, the procedures for system upgrading and the
installation of modification kits in the field, and so on.
The maintenance plan attempts to integrate and summarize
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